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The argument to be made in this paper regarding the changing social structure
of global cities is very straightforward. It is that we cannot understand the
changing structure of the housing market and residential social segregation
independently of changes in the economic base of cities and their role in the
national and international economy, and the related changes in occupational
structure, earnings and incomes. In this respect, my argument is closely related
to that of Friedmann and Wolff (1982) and Sassen (1991, 2001) on the role of
world and global cities. Friedman and Wolff argue that capitalist institutions,
particularly transnational corporations, have increasingly freed themselves
from national constraints and have begun to organise global production and
markets for their own purposes. They argue that different localities are
enmeshed with the global system in a variety of ways, and that: 
“at the apex of the urban hierarchy of influence and control are found a
small number of massive urban regions, that we shall call world cities.
Tightly inter-connected with each other through decision-making and
finance, they constitute a worldwide system of control over production and
market expansion” (p. 2).
They note that the notion of a world economy articulated through urban
structures is not new but they argue that recent decades have seen the
emergence of a truly global world economy controlled from what Wallerstein
termed the core areas of the global economy: the older, already industrialized
and possibly post-industrial regions that contain the vast majority of corporate
headquarters and are the major markets for world production. They argue that:
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“World cities are a material manifestation of this control, and they occur
exclusively in core and semi-peripheral regions where they serve as
banking and financial centres, administrative headquarters, centres of
ideological control…Without them, the world spanning system of
economic relations would be unthinkable” (pp. 311-312).
For Friedmann and Wolff, world cities play a dual role, lying at the junction
between the world economy and the territorial nation state. They point out that
there is nothing inevitable about either the structure of the world economy or
its exact materialization in world cities, and that the driving forces of
competition, the need for accumulation and political struggles make the
intersection of the world economy and world cities a point of intense conflict.
Nonetheless, they put forward the central hypothesis that: 
“the mode of world system integration will affect in determinate ways the
economic, social, spatial and political structure of world cities and the
urbanising processes to which they are subject” (p. 313).
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY
AND URBAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Friedmann and Wolff suggest that a primary fact about emerging world cities is
the impact which shifts in the structure of their economy and employment will
have on the social composition of their population. They suggest that the
dynamism of the world city economy results chiefly from the growth of a
primary cluster of high-level business services which employs a large number
of professionals – the transnational elite – and ancillary staffs of clerical
personnel:
“The activities are those which are coming to define the chief economic
functions of a world city: management, banking and finance, legal services,
accounting, technical consulting, telecommunications and computing,
international transportation, research, and higher education” (p. 320).
They also point out that a secondary cluster of employment, which serves
the first, and which employs fewer professionals, is also growing. This
includes real estate, construction activities, hotel services, restaurants, luxury
shopping, entertainment, private security and domestic services. This cluster is
also linked to, and overlaps with one which focuses on international tourism.
The growth of all three clusters is taking place at the expense of manufacturing
employment which is in declining. Importantly, Friedmann and Wolff go on to
argue that:
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“The primary social fact about world city formation is the polarization of
its social class divisions…. Transnational elites are the dominant class in
the world city, and the city is arranged to cater to their life styles and
occupational necessities…. The contrast with the third (or so) of the
population who make up the permanent underclass of the world city could
scarcely be more striking…. (emphasis added pp. 322-323)”.
In terms of income and wealth, they note that world cities have major
concentrations of both wealth and poverty, and finally they note that: “in its
internal spatial structure, the world city may be divided into the ‘citadel’ and
the ‘ghetto’. Its geography is typically one of inequality and class domination”
(p. 325).
In most respects, Friedmann and Wolff’s characterisation of the role,
structure and nature of world cities is essentially accurate. They focus on the
role of these cities in controlling, organising and running much of the world
economy and financial system, on their consequent industrial, occupational and
earnings structure and on the nature of their social and spatial organisation and
they point to the leading role of the transnational elite in structuring these
cities. I am less convinced by their claims that world cities inevitably have a
“polarised” class structure, a term which they do not define. If they mean that
there is a sharp distinction between the “transnational elite” and those at the
bottom of the class structure I have no problem with their claim and there is
very strong evidence that world cities are characterised by high levels of
inequality. But if by polarization they mean an absolute and proportionate
growth at both the top and bottom end of the class and earnings/income
distribution combined with a “shrinking middle” the evidence is less clear.
Sassen (1991) sees polarization as an inevitable outcome of the shift from
manufacturing into services which she sees as characterised by a polarised
occupational and earnings distribution but there is a quite considerable body of
evidence which suggests that a dominant social characteristic of world cities is
growing professionalisation of their workforce associated with the rise of the
new transnational service class rather than polarisation (Hamnett, 1994a, 1996;
Preteceille, 1995, 2000). This is associated with growing inequality as the
earnings and incomes of this higher group steadily pull away from those of
other groups. 
The rest of this paper looks at the implications of the changing industrial,
occupation and earnings structure of London for the housing market,
residential segregation and gentrification. It will argue that there is a set of
close linkages between the changes taking place in the economic structure of
65
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the world’s major cities, their occupational class structure, their earning and
income structure, the housing market and the organisation of residential space
which collectively tend towards greater inequality. It argues that the shift from
manufacturing industry to financial and business services, and the associated
shift from manual occupations to professional, managerial and technical jobs,
which is linked to the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial city (Savitch,
1988) has led to a growth of earnings and income inequality. The greatly
expanded middle classes are able to use their purchasing power to outbid other
groups in the housing market and have expanded into previously working class
areas of the inner city. As a result of this process of gentrification, what
remains of the working class, along with disadvantaged ethnic groups, have
become concentrated in residual areas of social housing, often in the poorest
high rise and high density estates. At the other extreme, the professional and
middle classes are colonising large parts of the inner city, dramatically
changing the social geography of London in the process.
THE CHANGING ECONOMY OF LONDON: 
FROM INDUSTRIAL TO POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY
The economy of London, as one of the big three global financial centres,
parallels the structure identified by Friedmann and Wolff, and subsequently by
Sassen (1991) in her analysis of global cities with the shift from manufacturing
to finance and business services. The period from the mid 1960s onwards has
seen a dramatic contraction of London as a manufacturing centre. In 1961
London had 1.45 million manufacturing jobs, 684,000 in 1981 and 359,000 in
1991. In percentage terms, manufacturing has fallen from 34% of total
employment in 1961 to 18% in 1981, 11% in 1991 and 8% in 1998. The
decline in manufacturing employment in London appears to have stabilised in
the 1990s. The sector employed 280,000 in 1998 compared to 282,000 in 1993.
But over 50 percent of those employed in the manufacturing sector in London
work in offices of manufacturing companies who produce elsewhere. London’s
manufacturing base is therefore now primarily one of command and control
functions (see table 1).
Paralleling this decline in manufacturing employment has been a rapid
expansion of jobs in the service industries. Like most other major global cities
London has become a centre of service employment, particularly banking,
finance, insurance and business services. From 1981-91 the service sector
expanded from 74.6 per cent to 84 per cent and banking and finance grew from
16 per cent to 22.5 per cent of employment.
66
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Although job growth in London’s  financial sector in the 1990s was lower
than in the previous decade, as a result of the job losses which have taken place
in retail banking, business services and the financial sector continued to be the
main driving force in the London economy in the 1990s, with business services
adding 200,000 new jobs. By 1997, finance and business services accounted
for 30.6 per cent of employment, more than any other sector and 4 times that of
manufacturing industry. By comparison, finance and business services
accounted for just 18 per cent of jobs in the UK as a whole, almost the same
level as manufacturing. As a result of these changes the economy of London
has been dramatically reshaped in the last forty years (Figure 1). 
Over the period 1981-1998 employment in real estate, renting and business
activities in Greater London increased by 376,000 or 92 per cent from 408,000
(11.6% of total employment) to 784,000 (22.1%). From just one in ten of jobs
in Greater London in 1981, the business and professional services sector
accounted for 1 in 5 jobs by 1998. (Daniels 2000). This is a major increase and
highlights the importance of this sector for the London economy. It eclipsed
the growth shown by the financial sector.
67
Employment by industrial sector Change in employment by
1981 1991 industrial sector 1981-91
Number % Number % Number % Change ppc
Primary industries 57275 1.6 41364 1.3 -15911 -27.8 -0.3
Manufacturing 
industry 683951 19.2 358848 11 -325103 -47.5 -8.2
Construction 161407 4.5 118367 3.6 -43040 -26.7 -0.9
Distribution, hotels 686598 19.3 645955 19.8 -40643 -5.9 0.5
and catering: repairs
Transport and comms 368288 10.3 307682 9.5 -60606 -16.5 -0.8
Banking, finance, 565876 15.9 733513 22.5 167637 29.6 6.6
insurance, business 
services
Other services 1034526 29.1 1049015 32.2 14489 1.4 3.1
Total services 2655288 74.6 2736165 84.1 80877 3 9.5
Total employment 3560688 100 3254744 100 -305944 -8.6 0
TABLE 1
The employment structure of Greater London, 1981 and 1991
Source: Census of Population, 1981 and 1991.
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CHANGES IN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE
Not surprisingly, these changes in industrial structure have been reflected by
changes in the occupational structure of London. As manufacturing industry
has declined to be replaced by business and financial services and the cultural
industries, so traditional manual work has declined to be replaced by service
68
FIGURE 1
The changing employment structure of Greater London, 1961-1998
Job change 1993-98 Job change 1983-88
Finance 25,000 58,000
Business services 210,000 126,000
Hotels and restaurants 56,000 16,000
Manufacturing 0 -142,000
All other 179,000 34,000
Total job change 470,000 92,000
Percentage change 15.2 2.7
TABLE 2
Employment change in London during the 1980s and 1990s expansion
Source: Banks and Scanlon (2000) from Annual Employment Survey, ONS 1998.
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sector jobs. But as is argued elsewhere (Hamnett, 1994b,1996) the changes in
socio-occupational structure of the economically active workforce do not show
evidence of any shift to polarisation as Friedman, Sassen and Castells suggest. 
On the contrary, the changes show consistent long term growth in the
professional (socio-economic groups SEGs 3 and 4) and managerial (1 and 2)
non-manual labour force, stability in the junior and intermediate non-manual
group (seg’s  5 and 6), and sharp declines in both the absolute size and proportions
of skilled (8, 9, 12 and 14), semi-skilled (7, 10, 15) and unskilled groups (11)
(Figure 2).  Similar trends can be seen for economically active females (not
shown) although their occupational  distribution is very different, with a far lower
proportion of professional and managerial and skilled manual workers and a much
higher proportion of junior and intermediate non-manual workers. In other words,
the census shows no evidence of an absolute growth of low skilled service
workers as the polarisation thesis suggests. On the contrary, this sector has shrunk.
I interpret these trends as indicating a growing “professionalisation” rather than
polarisation and similar work by Preteceille on Paris (1995) and Mollenkopf and
Castells (1991) on New York confirms this trend. 
These findings run directly counter to the conventional wisdom regarding
polarisation of the occupational class structure of global cities and it is
necessary to explain them. First the critics attempt to explain away the findings
by arguing that official census and labour force statistics do not capture the
“true” nature of labour force changes (to which they somehow have direct
access not granted to those who use existing official data sources). They give
two reasons. First, that many unskilled people work in the undocumented,
informal economy and are not captured in the official statistics, and second that
there is upwards occupational “creep” in job descriptions which conceals the
true nature of jobs, many of which are being deskilled (Cox and Watt, 2002).
69
London UK
Finance and business services 30.6 18.1
Distribution, hotels and catering 21.7 22.5
Education, social work and health 14.9 18.7
Transport, communications 8.3 5.7
Manufacturing 8.1 17.8
All other 16.1 16.5
Total 100 100
TABLE 3
Employment by Industry, 1997, (%)
Source: Focus on London, 1999, ONS.
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Both points have some validity but there is no systematic empirical evidence
for this view.
Second, they ignore the fact that, over the last 30 years or so, major
economic change has dispensed with large number of less skilled manual
workers in both services and manufacturing. In Britain, for example, large
numbers of low skill service sector jobs as bus conductors, railway guards and
porters have been lost on the railways and in public transport. These losses are
likely to have more than offset any growth in low skilled catering and service
sector jobs. As Ruth Glass (1973) pointed out almost thirty years ago:
“The image conveyed by the term ‘polarisation’ (alias the ‘rout of the middle
classes’) is, first, that both the top and bottom groups in the society of
London are becoming larger, at the expense of the middle strata; second, that
the extreme groups are, or will be, located in sharp juxtaposition to one
another – on either side of the ‘tracks’. Both these images are false. In fact,
the upper and middle strata are becoming stronger, numerically, in Greater
London, and the skilled manual group has remained stable, while the
proportion of non-skilled workers has decreased” (Glass, 1973, pp. 423-424).
70
FIGURE 2
Socio-economic groups (%), economically active males, 
Greater London, 1961-91
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EARNINGS AND INCOMES
Sassen’s polarisation thesis extends from occupational change to earnings and
income as she argues that earnings in the expanded service sector are more
bipolar than in the manufacturing sector which was characterised by a large
number of middle pay jobs. The trend in services is towards an expansion of
both highly skilled, highly paid jobs and an expansion of low skilled, low paid
jobs in personal services. She argued that:
“Major growth industries show a greater incidence of jobs at the high- and
low-paying ends of the scale than do the older industries now in decline.
Almost half the jobs in the producer services are lower income jobs, and
half are in the two highest earnings classes. In contrast, a large share of
manufacturing workers were in the middle earnings jobs during the post-
war period of high growth in these industries in the United States and the
United Kingdom” (Sassen, 1991, p. 9).
Again, however, the evidence from London does not support this argument.
On the contrary, London has seen a major expansion in the number of people
in well paid white collar jobs in the service sector and a disproportionate
increase in their earnings. 
Dividing the distribution on earnings in 1979 in deciles, then adjusting the
boundaries of each decile for changes in retail prices, and examining what
proportion of earners in 1993 fall into each category we find that with the
exception of the bottom decile of earners, which has grown very slightly,
expansion has all been at the top end. To the extent it is possible to say there
has been earning polarisation, it has been asymmetric polarisation, with far
greater growth at the top end of the earnings distribution than at the bottom
(Table 4). See Hamnett and Cross (1998) for a full analysis of the data.
There has, however, been a major increase in both individual earnings and
household income inequality over the period. What has driven these increases
in inequality? The answer is straightforward. It is not decreases in earnings or
household incomes at the bottom end of the distribution, but the large increases
in earnings and incomes at the top of the scale which have widened the gap
between top and bottom. The earnings at the top end are particularly marked
for those in non-manual occupations in the City of London. As a result of the
faster growth at the top end of the distribution, particularly in the top two
deciles, there has been an upwards shift of mean earnings. 
Table 5 shows that earnings in both the top decile and the top quartile rose
far more rapidly than in the bottom decile and quartile. In Great Britain as a
whole, earnings for the top quartile of male full-time workers rose by 37%
71
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compared to 15% for the bottom quartile, whereas earnings in the top and
bottom deciles rose by 49% and 7% respectively: a difference of 7:1. The same
pattern holds for both full-time and part-time females and indicates a
considerable increase in earnings inequality over the period. In Greater London
the discrepancy between increases in the earnings of full-time male workers in
the top and bottom deciles and the top and bottom quartiles was less marked,
largely as a result of the greater percentage increases in the earnings of these
72
Employed persons liable to social security (in 000s)
Deciles Gross weekly individual Size of group (%) Percentage point
Earnings in 1979 í's 1979 1993 change 1979-1993
London Decile cutting points
1 61.4 10 11.6 1.6 1.6
2 103.51 10 5.5 -4.5
3 141.85 10 6.6 -3.4
4 170.21 10 5.2 -4.8
5 195.16 10 5 -5 -24
6 219.81 10 4.5 -5.5
7 250.35 10 7.4 -2.6
8 286.77 10 6.9 -3.1
9 355.25 10 14.9 4.9
10 10 32.4 22.4 22.4
Britain Decile cutting points
1 44.39 10 11.1 1.1 1.1
2 79.55 10 9.8 -0.2
3 115.3 10 7.8 -2.2
4 145.95 10 7.1 -2.9
5 172.91 10 6.8 -3.2 -16.1
6 200.33 10 6.7 -3.3
7 230.5 10 7.7 -2.3
8 267.31 10 8.4 -1.6
9 325.74 10 9.6 -0.4
10 10 25 15 15
TABLE 4
Changing proportions of earners by deciles, 1979 and 1993 
(earnings adjusted to April 1993 prices using RPI)
3. Ηammett  27-06-07 10:40  Σελίδα 72
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 03:46:00 |
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE AND INEQUALITY IN GLOBAL CITIES
groups than in Britain as a whole. Nonetheless, while earnings of the top decile
in Greater London rose by 73% over the period, the earnings of the bottom
decile rose by only 18%: a ratio of 4:1. The comparable quartile figures were
56% and 27% respectively: a ratio of 2:1. For female full-time employees,
earnings in the top decile increased by a remarkable 83% but even in the
bottom decile it was still 45%: much higher than the lowest decile of male
workers. The male-female earnings gap has been narrowed,but it has not
disappeared. This argument that the growth of inequality is driven by earnings
growth at the top is strongly supported by Gordon (2000) who notes that:
“Earnings inequalities in the London labour market are greater than in the
country as a whole, although this is almost entirely due to the top tail of the
earnings distribution among male non-manual workers (where the top
decile was 75 per cent above the average, and 4.3 times the lowest decile,
compare with 3.7 times nationally). In other words, it reflects the presence
of a disproportionately large number of very highly rewarded professional
and managerial workers, rather than any larger number of poorly paid jobs”
(Gordon, 2000, pp. 19-20).
The impact of these differential changes in earnings can be summarised
using inter-decile and inter-quartile ratios. Table 6 shows that earnings
inequality was more marked in London in 1979 than in South East or GB as a
whole: the inter-decile ratio for male full-time workers in 1979 was 2.4 in GB,
2.5 in the South East and 2.6 in London. In other words the earnings of the top
decile were 2.6 times the earnings of the lowest decile in London. By 1995
73
Male full-time Female full-time Female part-time
workers workers workers
GB SE GL GB SE GL GB SE GL
Top decile 48.6 62.4 73.1 69.5 76.5 83.4 82.3 97.3 97.2
Top quartile 37.3 48.3 55.9 66.4 72.9 77.9 45.9 55.8 65.5
Mean 34.6 46.9 57.2 56.1 65.5 73.5 44.8 55.7 60.9
Median 25.4 34.4 41.1 48 58.7 46.5 28.9 35.3 44.1
Bottom quartile 14.6 22.2 27 36.6 46.5 54.7 16.2 22.9 27.8
Bottom decile 7.1 11.7 17.8 26.6 36.1 45.4 10.8 14.3 16.7
TABLE 5
Percentage increase in gross weekly pay, 1979-1995 (at April 1995 prices)
for Great Britain, the South East, and Greater London
Source: New Earnings Survey, 1979 and 1995.
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these ratios had risen to 3.3, 3.64 and 3.82 respectively. This shows two things.
First, that earnings inequality rose across the country as a whole, but second
that it was particularly marked in London. For full-time female employees the
picture was rather different. Earnings inequality increased across Britain as a
whole but it was slightly lower in London than in Britain as a whole. This may
reflect a greater demand for female labour in London. A similar picture for
when manual and non-manual earnings although non-manual workers saw
much greater rises than manual workers in virtually every category. Similar
changes can be seen in the distribution of household incomes (not shown),
which again show much larger increases at the top end of the distribution. 
GENTRIFICATION AND THE HOUSING MARKET
The impact of these changes in occupational and earnings structure on the
housing market and the socio-spatial structure of London since the 1970s have
been dramatic. There has been a massive growth of home ownership in inner
London and widespread gentrification as the growing middle class of
professional and managerial workers has  faced rising house prices particularly
in the existing middle class residential areas. The solution for many middle
class households has been to seek good quality, affordable homes in working
class areas of the inner city (Figure 3). The changes were perceptively and
accurately foreseen by Ruth Glass in the early 1960s. She stated that:
“London is now being ‘renewed’ at a rapid pace – but not on the model
about which we are so often warned. Inner London is not being ‘Ameri-
74
Male full-time Female full-time Female part-time
workers workers workers
IQ ratio ID ratio IQ ratio ID ratio ID ratio
1979 1995 1979 1995 1979 1995 1979 1995 1979 1995
Great Britain 1.56 1.87 2.38 3.3 1.52 1.85 2.28 3.05 1.79 2.94
South East 1.6 1.95 2.5 3.64 1.53 1.81 2.29 2.98 1.9 3.28
Greater Lon 1.62 2.01 2.6 3.82 1.48 1.7 2.26 2.85 1.98 3.34
GL/GB 1.04 1.07 1.09 1.16 0.97 0.92 0.99 0.93 1.11 1.14
TABLE 6
Changes in Interquartile (IQ) and Interdecile (ID) ratios, 1979-1995
Source: Calculated from Hamnett and Cross.
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canised’: it is not on the way to becoming mainly a working class city, a
‘polarised’ city, or a vast ghetto for a black proletariat. The real risk for
Inner London is that it might well be gentrified with  a vengence, and be
almost exclusively reserved for selected higher class strata” 
[Glass, 1973 (1989, p. 178)].
“One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been
invaded by the middle classes-upper and lower- shabby modest mews and
cottages –two rooms up and two down– have been taken over when their
leases expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger
Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period – which were
used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation – have
been upgraded once again...Once this process of ‘gentrification’ starts in a
district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class
occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is
changed” (Glass, 1964, p. xviii).
The social consequences of gentrification are predictable. In a competitive
housing market where access is ruled by price, the expansion of the middle
classes in inner London has been association with the rolling back of the less
75
FIGURE 3
Professional and mangerial workers (%), by Borough 1981 -v- percentage
change in profesional and managerial workers, 1981-1991
%
% Professional and managerial, 1981
% Change in profesional and managerial workers, 1981-1991
K
e
n
si
n
g
to
n
B
ro
m
le
y
K
in
g
st
on
S
u
tt
on
C
ro
yd
on
M
e
rt
on
H
ill
in
g
d
on
H
am
m
e
rs
m
ith
B
re
n
t
H
av
e
ri
n
g
H
ar
in
ge
y
G
re
e
n
w
ic
h
L
ew
is
h
am
S
ou
th
w
ar
k
B
ar
ki
n
g
To
w
e
r 
H
am
le
ts
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
3. Ηammett  27-06-07 10:40  Σελίδα 75
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 03:46:00 |
CHRIS HAMNETT
skilled, the unemployed, the poor and ethnic minorities who have been steadily
concentrated into the remaining inner London local authority estates and the
growing housing association sector. Once again the whole process was
anticipated by Ruth Glass (1964, 1989) who noted that:
“any district in or near London, however dingy, or unfashionable, is likely
to become expensive, and London may quite soon be a city which
illustrates the principle of the survival of the fittest: the financially fittest,
who can still afford to work and live there” (1989, pp. 177-178).
Average property prices in London have risen dramatically in recent years: by
almost 100% from 1995-2001, but in the prestigious central London boroughs of
Kensington and Chelsea, average prices rose by 152% and in Tower Hamlets, the
borough which contains many of the new Docklands luxury apartments, prices
rose by 160%. There have also been above average increases in most of the inner
London boroughs while in suburban outer London, prices rose more slowly. On
the other hand, social rented housing has become increasingly dominated by the
economically inactive, the low skilled, the unemployed and a variety of minority
groups. As a result, the housing market in London has become increasingly
socially polarised between an affluent owner occupied sector and an increasingly
impoverished social rented sector. Figure 4 shows the extent of social
polarisation by housing tenure in 1991. The results are striking. The
overwhelming majority of professional and managerial workers live in owner
occupied housing, with less than 10 per cent in social housing. This contrasts to
the unskilled and the economically inactive (retired, permanently sick etc) over
60 percent of whom are found in social housing. Similarly, certain ethnic groups
are disproportionately concentrated in social housing. 
The result of these two processes has perhaps led to a decline in social
segregation at the macro scale in London. There is no longer a small middle
class residential area in central London surrounded by a homogeneous sea of
working class housing. Rather, the middle classes have expanded outwards into
a number of hitherto working class areas. This has had the result of reducing
social segregation at the borough and ward scale. The social class composition
of inner London is now far more mixed than it was 30 years ago. But, and this
is crucial, at the local or micro level, segregation has risen between wealthy
home owners in one street, and low skilled, unemployed, low income council
tenants a few blocks away. The contrasts in income and wealth are now sharper
at the micro scale, even though they are lower at the wider geographical scale.
Rich and poor, once almost invisible to one another by virtue of their
residential segregation, are now highly visible. This has brought with it greater
social tensions. 
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As Glass (1973) perceptively pointed out:
“the ‘colonising’ drive of higher classes in London has been accelerated;
and so  working class quarters are becoming more constricted. Apart from
the very rich, it is mainly the young members (or aspiring members) of the
middle-upper strata, single people or couples without family
responsibilities, who are prepared to pay the exorbitant housing prices of
the inner sector. As these people live mainly in one- or two-person
households, they have a disproportionately large number of households,
and a disproportionately large housing demand, in relation to the total
population size of their group…There are few hurdles in their path. The
working class population of Inner London, old timers or recent recruits, are
in every respect ‘less equal’ not only in terms of income, status,
expectations, but also in terms of age and dependency ratios. They have a
higher share of old people, young children, large households. They find it
more difficult to resist being displaced or hemmed in” (pp. 425-426).
She went on to add that: 
“traditionally, the most elegant neighbourhoods… used to be socially
mixed (or, as might be said nowadays, polarized). While in such areas the
upper class was socially predominant, it was statistically in a minority…
This kind of mixture is beginning to be much slighter; in such places, the
top class (professional and managerial group) has already become, or is on
the verge of becoming, the statistical majority. At the same time, a new kind
of apparent class mixture is developing  in inner areas which were
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FIGURE 4
Socio-tenurial polarisation in Inner London, 1991
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previously almost wholly working class, and which have now acquired a
quite substantial middle-upper class component. But this is likely to be
quite often only the first stage of the gentrification process, whereby the
working class will be reduced, before long, to the status of a statistical
minority in such areas” (Glass, 1973, p. 425).
Glass was remarkably preciscent in her ability to predict the future of social
change in inner London. As she foresaw, gentrification has been accompanied
by the departure or squeezing out of the working class from many of its
traditional inner city bastions. David Ley (1981) has suggested that what
gentrification has done is to shift the social structure of the late twentieth
century city back in time, from an industrial to a post-industrial pattern which
is, in some ways, reminiscent of the pre-industrial pattern.
“Present social, economic, and political trends are redefining the
morphology inherited from the industrial city…If present trends accelerate, the
social geography of the nineteenth century city may appear to urban scholars of
the future as a temporary interlude to a more historically persistent pattern of
higher-status residential areas adjacent to the downtown core” (Ley, 1981, p.
145).
Such radical changes do not happen without social costs, however, and
there has been a major debate in the literature (Atkinson, 2000a and b;
Marcuse, 1986; Smith, 1996) over the extent and implications of gentrification
induced residential displacement of the original working class population. The
academic consensus is that gentrification is accompanied by large scale
working class displacement with substantial social costs.  Whilst there is no
doubt that there is some displacement, it can be argued that in cases such as
London, where there has been a large scale and long term transformation in the
economy and socio-economic composition of the city, it may be more
appropriate to think of replacement rather than displacement. I have argued
elsewhere (Hamnett, 2003a and b) that the last 40 years have seen a substantial
contraction of the working class in London as a result of retirement, death and
out-migration and replacement by an expanded middle class. As a result many
inner city residential areas have seen a contraction in the size and proportion of
their working class population, an expansion of their middle class population,
and a change in housing tenure structure. It may be more appropriate to view
these changes as two sides of a process of structural change rather than as a
direct consequence of gentrification induced displacement. 
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